The Effects of Financial Sector Development on Innovation as an Engine of Sustained Growth by Kim, Pilhyun
The Effects of Financial Sector 
Development on Innovation
as an Engine of Sustained Growth
Pilhyun Kim *1
The finance-led growth hypothesis states that financial 
development promotes economic growth by enhancing either 
efficiency of capital accumulation or technological innovation or 
both. A typical strategy to test the validity of the hypothesis is 
to regress measures of financial development on aggregate 
growth measures such as GDP per capital growth. This type of 
approach is problematic because of simultaneity. Furthermore, 
the channel of influence from the financial sector to the real 
sector is not specified. This paper focuses on the innovation 
channel of influence and tests whether financial development 
positively affects the rate of technological innovation. By 
focusing on a specific channel of influence, simultaneity is 
ameliorated. Using a panel of patent application data of 
developing countries as a proxy for technological innovation, this 
paper provides evidence that financial development seems to be 
an important determinant of the rate of technological innovation 
across countries and over time.
Keywords: The finance-led growth, Patent, Innovation, 
Simultaneity, Panel
JEL Classification: E10, E44, G20, O16, O30, O43
* Research Fellow, Korea Economic Research Institute, 12th FL. BLDG., 
28-1, Yoido-dong, Yongdungpo-gu, Seoul 150-756, Korea, (Tel) +82-2-3771-
0048, (E-mail) phkim@keri.org. I am grateful to Dr. Paul Evans, Dr. M. 
Ogaki, and Dr. Pok-sang Lam for their valuable advice. My sincere gratitude 
goes to Professor Se-Jik Kim at Seoul National University and Kyoobok Lee at 
Korea Institute of Finance for their useful comments. The usual disclaimers 
apply. This paper does not represent any official opinion of the Korean 
Economic Research Institute. Paper prepared for the 14th Seoul Journal of 
Economics International Symposium held at Seoul National University, Seoul, 
November 24, 2006.
[Seoul Journal of Economics 2007, Vol. 20, No. 1]
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS130
I. Introduction
Recently, much research has been done to examine the link 
between financial development and economic growth. A large number 
of empirical papers were written to either support or refute the 
hypothesis that financial development promotes economic growth, 
the idea that was originally proposed by Bagehot (1873) almost two 
centuries ago. Regardless of these efforts, no clear-cut answer exists 
yet as to whether or not a better financial sector is an important 
determinant of economic growth due to, in no small part, well-known 
econometric difficulties. 
The goal of this study is to shed a new light on the finance-growth 
nexus by focusing on a particular channel of influence from the 
financial sector to economic growth. In order to achieve this goal, I 
start with two fundamental propositions. First, a purposeful research 
activity aimed at promoting technological innovation is a fundamental 
source of economic growth, and that this activity necessitates the 
use of funds. Second, it is posited that a flow of funds needed to 
sustain economic activities is partially affected by agency costs, that 
proxy for the level of development of the financial sector that 
provides the funds. The idea is that the agency costs will be lower 
with a better developed financial sector, and this will enable a larger 
flow of funds into the research sector, thus allowing a more rapid 
rate of technological innovation. If the finance-led growth hypothesis 
is correct, then one should be able to see evidence of financial 
development having positive effects on the rate of technological 
innovation, which is the main engine of economic growth.
To examine this hypothesis, I extend a simple model of standard 
endogenous growth where the degree of financial development is 
proxied by the costs of borrowing. The purpose of this practice is to 
illustrate how the innovative process could be hampered by high 
borrowing costs in a simple endogenous growth setting. With this 
model as a theoretical motivation, I examine empirically whether 
financial development has positive effects on the rate of technological 
innovation. Using patents as a proxy for technological innovation and 
a panel of patent growth rates of 27 developing countries from 1970 
to 2000, this study finds support for the finance-led growth hypothesis. 
The evidence suggests that a better developed financial sector is a 
significant determinant of patent growth rates in these countries. 
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II. Literature Review
The literature on the finance-led growth hypothesis is vast. To get 
a better grasp of where empirical studies stand relative to theoretical 
models of this hypothesis, I first briefly review the models of the 
finance-led growth.
As noted in the previous section, the idea that a well-developed 
financial sector exerts positive influences on the rate of economic 
growth was originally proposed by Bagehot (1873). Goldsmith (1969), 
McKinnon (1973), and Shaw (1973) were a first group of researchers 
who conducted a systematic empirical investigation of this idea, and 
they found that there exist a positive relationship between financial 
development and economic growth. However, the lack of a formal 
theoretical foundation prevented the finance-led growth hypothesis 
from gaining currency among researchers. Then, the arrival of 
endogenous growth with its rich implications provided a fertile 
ground on which to build economic models where the financial 
sector positively affects those factors that are considered to be 
driving forces of economic growth. Among those factors, the ones 
that received most attention by researchers of the finance-led growth 
are productivity and capital accumulation.
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Bencievenga and Smith (1991) 
studied how the provision of liquidity by the banking sector affects 
economic growth. In their model, the banking sector enables more 
investment in illiquid/productive assets by minimizing adverse effects 
of random liquidity shocks, and thereby enhances the efficiency of 
capital accumulation and economic growth. Roubini and Sala-i- 
Martin (1995) shows how a reduction of agency costs due to 
financial development can lead to faster economic growth. Their idea 
is similar to Bencievenga and Smith (1991) in that a lower agency 
cost allows a larger share of savings to be channeled into investment 
(illiquid/productive assets in Bencievenga and Smith' model). All in 
all, a common thread in this type of models is the assumption that 
capital accumulation has growth-enhancing effects.
Recent empirical studies forcefully suggest that capital accumulation 
may not be an important determinant of economic growth. The 
evidence suggests that what explains most of income and growth 
differences across countries is not capital accumulation but 
“residuals” (Easterly and Levine 2001). A line of research that 
focuses on the relationship between financial development and 
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innovation/productivity includes King and Levine (1993) and 
Galetovic (1996). In their models, the role of the financial sector is to 
monitor and/or screen innovative activities. The existence of the 
financial sector promotes more (efficient) investment in innovation 
and thus faster economic growth. Saint-Paul (1992) takes a slightly 
different approach. While his main theme is similar to the others in 
spirit, he focuses on how the financial sector, in his case a stock 
market, allows firms to specialize and achieve higher productivity by 
reducing idiosyncratic risks associated with productive but risky 
technologies.
Overall, the channels of influence that the theoretical models of 
the finance-led growth suggest is that financial development 
enhances economic growth by allowing either more efficient 
accumulation of capital or more efficient investment in innovative 
activities.
A flood of empirical studies began to appear in the 1990s to test 
the validity of the finance-led growth hypothesis. Unfortunately, 
theoretical models of finance-led growth do not provide empirical 
researchers with structural guidelines on which they can base their 
estimation. As a result, one is forced to use reduced-form estimation 
and test the general conclusion of these models. A typical test 
strategy involves regressing some indicator of financial development 
on aggregate growth measures such as investment growth, GDP 
growth or total factor productivity growth.1
A first attempt in this direction was made by employing 
cross-sectional estimation (King and Levine 1993; De Gregorio and 
Guidotti 1995). Using a cross-sectional framework, they find a 
positive relationship between financial development and economic 
growth. However, a potentially endogenous relationship between 
financial development and economic growth made interpretation of 
these results difficult. Demetriades and Hussein (1996) and 
Odedokun (1996) take a Granger causality approach to avoid these 
problems and present mixed results. They find that the effects of 
financial development on growth are country-specific. Based on their 
findings, they argue that a robust test of the finance-led growth 
hypothesis should incorporate the time dimension of the data under 
consideration. Benhabib and Spiegel (2000) employ a panel GMM 
1 In this section, I discuss not the whole empirical literature but a select 
few that are representative of distinct research directions for brevity. 
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method to reach a similar conclusion and argue that weakened 
effects of finance with inclusion of fixed effects may indicate that 
financial development indicators are proxying for underlying country 
characteristics.
By and large, the current empirical literature lacks one crucial 
element in that they do not consider the channels of influence 
suggested by theoretical models and fail to show how financial 
development affects economic growth. Furthermore, time-series 
approach, while potentially resolving endogeneity issue, does not tell 
us exactly what the relationship between financial development and 
economic growth is. In addition, their results are as difficult to 
interpret as cross-sectional estimation because Granger causality 
does not really provide an answer for the causal relationship between 
financial development and economic growth. Researchers who 
conduct causality tests in this area argue that, for some countries, 
economic growth causes financial development, when what they 
really should say is that economic growth Granger-causes financial 
development. This does not really address the question of what 
causes what, especially when one considers that, statistically, 
Christmas card sales Granger-cause Christmas. 
In sum, the current empirical literature suffers from two problems. 
First, as long as one regresses GDP growth on a measure of financial 
development, the issue of endogeneity is not satisfactorily resolved. 
Second, the channel of influence has not been specified so far, thus, 
limiting our understanding of how the financial sector affects growth.
In examining the validity of the finance-led growth hypothesis, I 
depart from the conventional literature. Instead of estimating a 
relationship between aggregate growth measures and financial 
development indicators as is commonly done in the current 
literature, I test whether financial development enhances innovation. 
By narrowing the focus of investigation this way, I argue that the 
problem of endogeneity is ameliorated and that a channel of 
influence can be specified, leading to more meaningful policy 
implications.
In Section II, I provide a theoretical motivation for the empirical 
analysis by extending a simple model of endogenous growth to 
include agency costs and draw a testable implication. In Section III, I 
discuss the estimation strategy employed and the issues that need to 
be addressed. In Section IV, I conclude.
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III. Theoretical Background
Given the plentiful supply of theoretical models where the financial 
sector interacts with innovators to make an economy grow faster, my 
aim in this section is not to propose yet another new model but to 
illustrate briefly how the financial sector can promote innovation 
under a basic endogenous growth structure. 
One of the common assumptions made in finance-led growth 
theories is that the financial sector (mainly the banking sector) 
actively monitors borrowers of funds. Allen and Gale (2001) show 
that evidence is to the contrary. They show that in most cases, the 
banking sector does not serve as an active monitor. The rationale for 
this is that often times the banking sector makes a debt contract 
with the borrowers in which profits of a lending bank are not 
dependent upon the borrower's degree of success. Rather, they 
simply depend on whether the borrower succeeds or not.2 Therefore, 
the welfare of the lending bank will depend more on how well it 
screens out the bad borrowers and less on its effectiveness as a 
monitor. Based on this observation, I extend a simple model of 
endogenous growth (Jones 2002) to illustrate how the agency cost 
affects the rate of technological innovation. 
A. Final Goods Sector
A perfectly competitive final goods sector produces a single 
homogenous consumption good by combining labor and intermediate 




α dj,                           (1)
where A is the number of intermediate goods used and x is the 
amount of intermediate good j used and is between 0 and 1. Given 
this production function, and normalizing the price of final goods to 




pj x j dj, where pj is the price of an intermediate good j. Profit 
maximization gives the price of an intermediate good j as
2
Of course, this is not the case for equity contracts. However, in most 
cases, equity markets are relatively small in terms of intermediating funds 
and are ignored in this paper.
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pj＝α x jα－1.                            (2)
B. Intermediate Goods Sector
The intermediate goods sector consists of monopolistic firms that 
buy designs from the research sector to be used in production of 
intermediate goods. These firms are monopolistic since the designs 
they buy are protected by patents that exclude others from using the 
same designs. Therefore, each monopolist produces only one type of 
intermediate good. With the design in hand, the monopolist produces 
intermediate goods using a one-to-one production function. In other 
words, the monopolist requires one unit of capital to produce one 
unit of intermediate good.
Formally, the monopolist maximizes the profit function given by
pj(x j)x j－rx j,                          (3)
where r is the interest rate for borrowing capital. The firm's supply of 
x j derived from the profit maximization, together with the demand 
schedule in Eq. (2), determines the price of x j to be equal to r/α , 
which implies that x j＝x and, consequently, that Y＝Ax
α .
Using Eq. (2). and pj＝r/α , we get x＝α 2Y/Ar. Then, the profit for 
each monopolist can be specified as
                         π1＝(p－r)x
＝α (1－α ) Y .                         (4)
A
Further, since the total amount of the intermediate goods used in 
the final goods sector, ∫0
A 
x i di＝Ax, should be equal to the total 
amount of capital spent in the intermediate goods sector, (1－aK)K, x 
is equal to (1－aK)K/A. Note that (1－aK) is the portion of capital 
stock used in the intermediate goods sector, and K is the total stock 
of capital in the economy. 
Finally, the production function turns out to be
Y＝A
1－α [(1－aK)K]
α .                       (5)
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C. The Research Sector
Recall that my primary goal in this section is to provide a 
theoretical sketch of how financial development affects innovation. I 
aim to show here that the share of capital spent in research sector 
is increasing in the degree of financial development as proxied by 
lower agency costs.
At this juncture, it would be useful to describe how the financial 
sector behaves in this model. First of all, the financial sector and its 
level of financial development are assumed to be exogenous in this 
setup. The reason for this simplification is that the main interest of 
this paper is to see whether or not the level of financial development 
has any effect on the real sector activity, not how the financial sector 
evolves over time or interacts with other players in the model.3 Then, 
in line with the current literature, the assumption that agency cost 
in provision of funds is negatively correlated with the level of 
financial development is made (Diamond and Dybvig 1983; 
Bencievenga and Smith 1991; Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 1995). 
Moreover, in this model, the financial sector incurs agency costs 
when it transacts with the researchers of which the results of their 
innovative activities are unknown at a time the funds are supplied. 
Therefore, the agency cost in this model can be regarded as extra 
costs that the financial sector incurs in its attempt to gauge the 
likelihood of successful innovative activities. Since the demand for 
funds by the researchers is inelastic, the financial transfers all the 
burden of agency costs to the researchers.4
In this model, each researcher faces a similar problem as the 
monopolist in the intermediate goods sector. In other words, each 
researcher borrows capital from the financial sector to finance her 
innovation. What is different from the monopolist's case is that the 
researcher's cost of borrowing capital is not r but r＋c where c is the 
exogenous agency costs. The researcher pays an additional cost of c 
because the financial sector has to screen the researchers when they 
borrow funds as described above. With this environment, the 
3
By this simplification, I am de facto accepting the notion that there is a 
feedback from the real sector to the financial sector. However, the key 
research question in this paper is whether or not financial development 
affects growth. 
4 The question of exactly who bears how much of the burden does not 
affect the model's implication as long as demand for funds is perfectly elastic. 
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researcher tries to maximize her profit based on her production 
function. I make a standard assumption that when the researcher 
innovates, she takes the actions of other researchers and the 
knowledge stock as given so that she faces the arrival rate of δ 
defined as
δ＝A1－β[aKK]β－1,                         (6)
where δ stands for the arrival rate of new technology per unit of 
capital spent on innovation at the individual researcher's level.
When a new technology is developed, assuming that the design 
lasts forever, the researcher receives a price, pA which is equal to the 
monopolist's profit discounted by r, (1－α )x/α . Since x＝α 2Y/Ar,
 pA＝
α (1－α )Y
.                         (7)
rA
Given the price pA and the arrival rate δ, the marginal product of 
capital spent in the research sector equals simply pAδ. Equating this 
to the marginal cost of capital, r＋c, and noting that r＝α 2Y/(1－aK)K, 






1－β [α 2( A )1－α ( 1 )1－α＋c ].   (8)α A K 1－aK
Although the Eq. (8) cannot be solved explicitly for aK, it can be 
seen that there exists a unique value of aK by noting that the LHS of 
the equation is decreasing in aK and that the RHS of the equation is 
increasing in aK for the entire range of aK.
D. The Growth of the Economy
Given the production function (5), I need to specify how the 
economy evolves over time. First, technological innovation occurs by 
the following law of motion:
At＝At
1－β[aKKt]
β,                        (9)
where β is between 0 and 1. This specification assumes that 
∙
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technological innovation is a function of capital devoted in the 
research sector. However, the production of new technologies faces 
diminishing returns in K. Furthermore, it assumes that the stock of 
knowledge in the economy also contributes to production of new 
technologies.
Following Solow (1956), I assume that the capital stock evolves by
Kt＝sYt,                           (10)
where s is a constant investment ratio. Also, assume, for simplicity, 
that there is no population growth so that n＝0. Substituting Eq. (5) 
into Eq. (10), and dividing both sides by Kt, the growth rate of 




At )1－α≡gK.   (11)
K Kt




Kt )β≡gA.   (12)
A At
Along the balanced growth path, the usual steady state condition 
applies so that gK＝gA＝g≡ the growth rate of the economy. 
Combining Eq. (11) and Eq. (12), the steady state growth rate of the 
economy, dropping time index, is given by
g＝[s(1－aK)
αaK
1－α ]β/(1－α＋β ),                (13)
and g’≥0 if aK≤1－α.
Note that the steady state growth rate of the economy is increasing 
in aK as long as the share of the capital spent in the research sector 
is less than or equal to 1－α. Further, it can be seen from Eq. (8) 
that the equilibrium amount of capital spent in the research sector 
is decreasing in the agency cost, c.
It is shown in this model that the steady state growth rate of the 
economy is increasing in aK, which is itself a decreasing function of 
the agency cost. Therefore, a better developed financial sector in this 
∙
∙
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model raises the rate of technological innovation by channeling more 
funds to the research sector. Having teased out the testable 
implication of the model, I proceed to an empirical examination of 
this hypothesis in the next section.
IV. Empirics
In the previous section, a basic model of endogenous growth with 
the financial sector was introduced. The testable implication drawn 
from that model was that financial development is associated with a 
faster rate of technological innovation. In this section, I empirically 
examine whether financial development does have any significant 
effect on the rate of technological innovation proxied by patent data.
A. Patents as a Proxy for Technological Innovation
Quantifying underlying technological changes in a given country is 
a difficult task. In the literature, variables such as R&D expenditure, 
the number of scientists and engineers, the number of articles 
published in scientific journals, and patent count data have been 
proposed as measures of technological innovations. The main 
difficulty with the first three variables is that they are not widely 
available for a long time span except for a few developed countries. 
Therefore, using these variables limits the number of countries a 
researcher can include in her sample to a selective few rich 
countries. 
An alternative and less direct measure of technological innovation 
that has been popular among researchers is Total Factor 
Productivity. By assuming a certain type aggregate production 
function, one can easily estimate this for a number of countries over 
a long period of time. However, this residual measure is only 
distantly related to technological innovation (Griliches 1990). In other 
words, it simply is something that economists do not have full 
understanding of how changes in total factor productivity are 
brought about. This ambiguous nature of total factor productivity 
(TFP) as a measure of technological innovation maybe harmless in 
some context, but can prove to be not so harmless in other cases. 
When the relationship under consideration is the one between 
development of the private financial sector and total factor 
productivity, we first need to have a well-defined idea about how the 
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former affects the latter. The theoretical literature is not clear on this 
as total factor productivity can be influenced by many factors, almost 
by definition, which may have nothing to do with what goes on in 
the financial sector. What the literature suggests is that financial 
development encourages more efficient allocation of investment 
among purposeful innovation projects. However, it does not tell us 
how financial development affects productivity as measured by total 
factor productivity.
In this study, I use patent data as a proxy for technological 
innovation. According to the USPTO, a patent is generally defined as 
a document issued by an authorized governmental agency, granting 
the right to exclude anyone else from the production or the use of a 
specific new device, apparatus, or process for a stated number of 
years. Using patent as a proxy for technological innovation to 
examine the effects of financial development on innovative activities 
has a number of advantages. Firstly, patent data is the most direct 
measure of innovative output. Contrary to other proxies of 
technological innovation mentioned above, “a patent does represent a 
minimal quantum of invention that has passed both the scrutiny of 
the patent office as to its novelty and the test of the investment of 
effort and resources by the inventor and his organization into the 
development of this product or idea, indicating thereby the presence 
of non-negligible expectation as its ultimate utility and 
marketability.” (Griliches 1990) Also, “patents are a direct outcome of 
the inventive process, and more specifically of those inventions, 
which are expected to have a commercial impact … a particularly 
appropriate indicator for capturing the propriety and competitive 
dimension of technological change.” (Archibugi and Pianta 1996) An 
inventor will apply for a patent right only if the perceived benefits 
are greater than the expected costs of obtaining patent protection. By 
its nature, patent data alludes us to qualities of innovations that are 
produced. Stern et al. (2000) argue that patents, by its very nature, 
reflect an important portion of the innovative output by a country 
and are the most concrete and comparable measure of innovative 
output across countries and time. Secondly, as mentioned above, 
patent data bears the closest resemblance to innovative output as 
described in the theoretical literature in this area. Furthermore, the 
relationship between financial development and innovative output is 
well-defined by existing theoretical models. It is also intuitively 
appealing to argue that patent production requires investments that 
FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT ON INNOVATION 141
are intermediated by the financial sector. Thirdly, and related to the 
second argument above, using patents allows a more concentrated 
focus on the effects the private financial sector has on technological 
innovation. Research shows that industries heavily involved in 
government contract work tend to patent fewer inventions of a given 
quality than those which pay for their own research (Comanor and 
Scherer 1969). This indicates that, compared to other measures of 
technological innovation, patent data reflects to a lesser degree the 
influence of government activities that are not associated with 
financial development.
Having argued that patent data is the best measure of 
technological innovation that serves the conceptual purpose of this 
study, there still remains a doubt if I may be barking at the wrong 
tree. An example is so-called Fox paradox. It states that in a given 
country, patent production may come from a small industry that 
does not affect the country's economic growth while a large industry 
that is actually responsible for the country's economic growth 
remains dormant in terms of patent production.5 Therefore, despite 
its advantages mentioned above, using patent data will not serve the 
empirical purpose of this study if it is not related to economic 
activities. Research shows that indeed this is not the case. Comanor 
and Scherer (1969) argue that a simple count of the number of 
patents reflects not statistical noise but a meaningful message in the 
results of studies using patents by showing that the correlation 
between patents and the value of new product sales is significant. 
On an aggregate level, using patent data as a measure of 
technological change, it is shown that a higher intensity of 
technological activities has a generally positive impact on national 
growth (Archibugi and Pianta 1996). Porter and Stern (2000) reach a 
similar conclusion in their study that there is a positive link between 
ideas production and realized productivity growth. Further, 
micro-based studies indicate that patents are actively utilized in 
production processes. They show that the share of patents actually 
used by firms range from 40% to 60% (Napolitano and Sirilli 1990). 
EPO survey found that the majority of European firms utilized their 
patents most of the time. Also, it found that 84% of patenting firms 
cited patents in the case of products and 71% in the case of 
5 Heterogeneity across countries such as this can be taken care of by using 
country dummies. 
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processes as their usual means of protecting new products and 
processes (Archibugi and Pianta 1996). These studies further 
strengthen the validity of using patent data as a proxy for 
technological innovation.
B. Specification
There are well-known concerns with respect to using patent data 
for economic analysis. First, there is an issue of heterogeneous 
quality of patents. Naturally, patents differ greatly in their technical 
and economic significance over time. Scherer (1965) suggests that 
the way to get around this issue is to invoke the law of large 
numbers. The idea is that by the law of large numbers, the economic 
significance of any sampled patent can be interpreted as a random 
variable with some probability distribution. Furthermore, the problem 
of differing qualities does not apply only to patent data. Other 
measures of technological innovation such as a simple count of 
scientists and engineers, or R&D expenditures are also prone to this 
problem. (Comanor and Scherer 1969). Given this fact, using patent 
data as a proxy for technological innovation may have more merits 
than other measures for it allows one to examine a wide range of 
countries.
Secondly, each country has a different propensity to patent arising 
from differences among countries in terms of their industrial 
composition. Thirdly, and related to the second, using USPTO patent 
data may exclude those innovations that are novel to a country but 
have been already discovered elsewhere, or those innovations that 
are not worthwhile patenting internationally. In order to take care of 
these two problems, I follow Eaton and Kortum (1996) and Porter 
and Stern (2000) and make an assumption similar to the one above. 
Specifically, it states that the value of innovations is distributed 
according to a fixed distribution across economies and a constant 
fraction of innovative output turns out to be valuable enough to 
justify an international patent. To the extent that this fractional 
value varies across countries, it is overcome through the use of fixed 
country specific effects in the regression.
Aside from the issues involved with using patent data as a proxy 
for technological innovation, as a matter of general principle in this 
literature, one needs to incorporate time-series dimension into 
estimation along with country specific effects (Demetriades and 
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Hussein 1996; Odedokun 1996; Benhabib and Spiegel 2000) to 
produce more reliable empirical results. Hence, the regression 
equation I estimate has the following form:
(Patent Growth Rate)it＝α i＋β i(Fianacial Development Indicators)it
＋γ (Control Variables)it＋ε it,             (14)
where α  is a country specific effect, i and t are country and time 
indexes, respectively.
C. Data
The patent data I use is based on the Technology Assessment and 
Forecast Report, compiled by the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) and reported to the World Intellectual 
Property Office on an annual basis. The motivation for using the 
U.S. patent data is based on the evidence that the U.S. has the 
lowest granting rate in the world (Griliches 1990). It indicates that 
the U.S. has the highest standard for granting patent rights and 
gives us a hint about qualities of inventions for which patent 
protection is asked. Porter and Stern (2000) argue that because 
USPTO approval requires that patents constitute novel, non-obvious 
inventions, patenting captures a sense of the degree to which a 
national economy is developing and commercializing new-to-the-world 
technologies and that by only including inventions that are granted 
patent protection in the U.S., we can be confident both that a 
relatively common standard has been applied and that the counted 
inventors are, in fact, near the global technological frontier. More 
importantly, using patent data from one source allows me to avoid 
the issue of heterogeneity across databases collected by various 
agencies. When one tries to combine the databases of several 
agencies, she needs to deal with different classification systems each 
agency has as well as quality differences in patents granted by 
different patent agencies. Many attempts have been made to handle 
these problems with only limited success. When a conceivable 
advantage of this kind of comprehensive data is basically a larger 
dataset, the benefit hardly outweighs the costs of having to deal with 
aforementioned problems. It is especially so if the number of 
countries covered in the U.S. dataset is reasonably large.
USPTO has six categories for patent grants; Utility, Design, Plant, 
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Reissue, DEF, and Statutory invention registration. Among them, 
what is relevant for this study is utility patents. According to the 
USPTO definition, these are patents that are issued for the invention 
of a new and useful process; machine, manufacture, or composition 
of matter, or a new and useful improvement thereof. Therefore, 
utility patents have a direct bearing on industrial production 
processes. Once granted, they provide twenty years of protection. 
This data contains both developed and developing countries, and the 
country of origin is based on the residence of the first named 
inventor.
Finding a single quantitative measure that captures every aspect of 
financial development is nearly impossible due to complexities 
involved with functions the financial serves in the economy. 
Therefore, I use three different indicators proposed in the literature 
to capture various aspects of financial development. They are
The ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP 
(henceforth, PC)
The ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP (henceforth, liquidity)
The ratio of deposit money bank assets to GDP (henceforth, 
DMBA) 6
PC measures the activity in channeling savings to investors and is 
equal to the ratio of claims on the domestic private sector by deposit 
money banks to GDP. The assumption is that as the financial sector 
develops, it will be able to channel more funds from savers to 
investors. De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) also suggest that PC 
represents more accurately the role of financial intermediaries in 
channeling funds to private market participants. Since the main role 
of the financial sector I emphasize in this section is to serve as an 
effective intermediary of funds, PC is the variable that I will be 
primarily interested in.
Liquidity is the most commonly used indicator of financial 
development and usually referred to as “financial depth.” It measures 
the overall size of the financial sector without distinguishing between 
the financial sectors or between the uses of liabilities (Beck et al. 
1999). It is equal to the ratio of currency plus demand and interest 
bearing liabilities of banks and other financial intermediaries to GDP. 
6
Data for these variables are from Beck et al. (1999).
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However, the use of liquidity as a financial development indicator 
has come under attack recently. De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) 
argue that it is conceivable that a high level of monetization (implied 
by a high level of liquidity) is a result of the lack of alternative assets 
that would serve as stores of value. Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union provide evidence for this scenario. To overcome this 
problem, one can use a broader measure of monetary aggregates 
such as M3. However, to the extent that M1 is included in M3, it 
does not resolve the problem. Moreover, the fact that M3/GDP is 
also the inverse of the velocity of circulation of the broad money 
stock suggests that a positive association between the level of 
financial development, proxied by liquidity, and real GDP is 
tantamount to a downward trend in the velocity of circulation and 
may simply reflect an income elasticity of the demand for money 
with respect to GDP which is greater than unity (Demetriades and 
Hussein 1996). So, I use liquidity for the sake of completeness and 
with reservations. 
Finally, I also use DMBA as another measure of financial 
development. DMBA is a so-called absolute size measure and reflects 
the importance of the financial services performed by the banking 
sector.7
Patrick (1966) argues that as the process of real growth occurs, 
the supply-leading impetus generally becomes less important and the 
demand-following financial response becomes dominant. Similarly, 
Fritz (1984), Jung (1986), and Dee (1986) suggest in their studies 
that developing countries have rather a supply-leading causality 
pattern of development than a demand-following pattern. What these 
studies say is that the developing countries should provide a fertile 
testing ground for finance-led growth hypothesis. If the hypothesis is 
not valid, a measure of financial development would not enter 
significantly in estimation. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe 
that choosing developing countries as a sample would present an 
upward bias in my estimation. In sum, if finance-led growth 
7
All the measures used here are the ratios of a stock variable to a flow 
variable, which creates problems with correct timing and in terms of deflating 
correctly. Beck et al. (1999) address these problems and calculate each 
measure by (1/2)(FDt/CPIe,t+FDt-1/CPIe,t-1)/(GDPt/CPIa,t), where e: end of period, 
a: average for the period. The end year of year CPI is either the value for 
December or, if not available, the value for the last quarter. For additional 
information, see their paper.
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TABLE 1
SAMPLE COUNTRIES USED IN THE REGRESSION
FIGURE 1
LONG RUN GDP GROWTH VS. LONG RUN PATENT GROWTH
hypothesis is valid, the effects of financial development will be strong 
and significant for developing countries, and if it is invalid, they will 
be insignificant regardless of the countries chosen. Therefore, I select 
27 developing countries from USPTO database to be included in the 
sample.8 Table 1 shows a list of countries that are included in the 
analysis. 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between averages of real GDP 
growth rates and patent growth rates over 1970-2000. It shows that 
the latter is closely related to the former, in line with the previous 
8





Costa Rica Israel Thailand
Dominican Republic Jamaica Trinidad & Tobago
Ecuador Korea Uruguay
Egypt Mexico Venezuela
Guatemala Malaysia South Africa
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discussion on the effects of patents produced on economic growth.9
In order to construct a panel data, I compute average growth rates 
of patent applications per million persons for six periods, 1970-74, 
75-79, 80-84, 85-89, 90-94, 95-2000, as a proxy for the rate of 
technological innovation. To measure the degree of financial 
development, I use the initial levels of financial development 
indicators for each corresponding period to ameliorate endogeneity.10
There are a couple of hand-waiving arguments against this as a 
solution for endogeneity. Firstly, if economic agents were 
forward-looking, the use of the initial levels of financial development 
indicators would not eliminate endogeneity (Rajan and Zingales 
1998). The idea is that, if the economy were expected to grow in the 
future, forward-looking economic agents would step up lending now 
hoping to take advantage of a economic boom in the future. Then, 
the level of financial intermediation today is going to be affected by 
future states of the economy. Hence, endogeneity still exists even if 
one uses the initial values of financial development indicators. This 
argument needs two assumptions satisfied to be valid. One is that, 
empirically, the dependent variable used in the regression is such 
that economic agents could observe its behavior, for example, its 
growth rate, easily enough so that the economy-wide change in 
lending activity could occur in response to the changes in its 
behavior. The other is that this change in lending activity is 
sufficiently big so that it affects the total volume of credit in a 
non-negligible manner. Aggregate growth measures typically used in 
this literature such as GDP per capita growth satisfy these 
assumptions. Thus, the argument by Rajan and Zingales (1998) is 
true if what the analysis focuses on is the relationship between the 
financial sector development and aggregate growth measures. 
However, the focus in this paper is on the relationship between the 
rate of technological change and the degree of financial development, 
and their argument does not apply well for two reasons. As for the 
first assumption mentioned above, the inherent nature of uncertainty 
associated with R&D activity makes it difficult for economic agents to 
observe the changes in the rate of technological innovation. In 
9 Although it would be an interesting exercise to statistically examine how 
well patent growth explains variations in output growth, it is not the main 
point of this paper. 
10
For a discussion of simultaneity, see Tsuru (2000).
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addition, there is no theoretical background to support that future 
economic conditions cause changes in the current rate of 
technological innovation. As a matter of fact, the consensus is that it 
is technological innovation that determines future economic 
conditions. Further, even if the first assumption is met, the resulting 
lending activity is not sufficiently big enough to affect the total 
volume of credit in a non-negligible manner since research is only a 
small part of what bank lending finances. Secondly, if financial 
development indicators are correlated across time, then using the 
initial values of financial development indicators would not remove 
endogeneity since they would simply be proxies for their 
contemporaneous levels (Demetriades and Hussein 1996). Figure 2 
shows movements of financial development indicators for sample 
countries across time. Significant variations in these indicators 
suggest that the use of initial values of financial development 
indicators is justified.
In order to select variables to control for other features of 
economic conditions that may influence patent growth, I adhere 
strictly to the recommendations of the R&D literature. R&D literature 
indicates that R&D effort is a significant determinant of technological 
innovation. The most commonly used measure of R&D effort for the 
developed countries is the number of researchers in the research 
sector. However, the data is not available for a long time span for 
developing countries. Therefore, I instead use the human capital 
measure compiled by Barro and Lee (2000). Among various measures 
they compiled, I use the percentage of the population 25 years of age 
or older who have attained “higher” education as a proxy for the 
number of researchers in the research sector assuming that the 
number of researchers in the research sector is positively correlated 
with the extent of college education in the population. Although this 
is a somewhat indirect measure of R&D effort, I believe it to be 
reasonable to think that much of the innovation stems from 
college-educated innovators. For my analysis, I use the initial levels 
of this measure for each corresponding period (Higher Education). 
This variable, according to the literature, is expected to have a 
positive effect on the patent growth rate. Therefore, the estimated 
coefficient should be positive. 
Intuitively, people alone cannot generally come up with 
technological breakthroughs if they lack infrastructure supporting 
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FIGURE 2
MOVEMENTS OF FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 
FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES
their R&D activities. This infrastructure is generally funded by 
institutions such as government, private businesses and academic 
institutions. The volume of funds that supports R&D activities from 
these institutions is conventionally measured by R&D expenditure 
data. This data is generally widely available for developed countries 
but not for developing countries. Perforce, I use the real domestic 
private investment data to proxy for investment in R&D in my 
analysis. Then, I compute the average levels of domestic private 
investment in the five years immediately preceding each period in the 
sample (Investment). The literature is not clear on what the sign of 
the estimated coefficient should be. Depending on the nature of 
returns to scale, the estimated coefficient can be either positive or 
negative. So, I will let the data speak for itself.
Knowledge production may also depend on the past knowledge 
stock. All the models of endogenous growth incorporate this 
intertemporal spillover effect in one way or another. I use the initial 
Liquidity
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS150
level of real GDP per capita for each corresponding period 
(Knowledge Stock) to capture this potential effect. This variable also 
captures the ability of a country to translate its knowledge stock into 
a realized state of economic development and so yields an aggregate 
control for a country's technological sophistication (Porter and Stern 
2000). Also, compared to other measures of the past knowledge stock 
such as the past patent stock, real GDP per capita provides a more 
comprehensive measure of the knowledge stock in the economy as 
the past patent stock may be industry-specific and does not convey 
information on the economy-wide knowledge stock. According to 
endogenous growth theories, the sign of the estimated coefficient 
should be positive. According to neoclassical growth theories, it 
should be negative. So, it would be interesting to see what the data 
says.
In addition to intertemporal spillover effects, there can also be a 
cross-country spillover effect. This will be especially true if a country 
is an active importer of sophisticated technologies as Japan had 
been in the 50's and 60's. Hence, an important way a country can 
learn from a technologically more developed country and hasten its 
own knowledge production is by importing technology embedded in 
goods. Based on this observation, I use Openness measured by the 
average levels of the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP in 
the five years immediately preceding each period in the sample to 
capture the potential cross-country spillover of knowledge. Again, the 
sign of the estimated coefficient is uncertain due to the fact that 
what I am considering here is patent applications filed in the U.S., 
the foreign country. If a catch-up effect is dominant, Openness 
should have a positive effect on the country's knowledge production. 
On the other hand, if a raising-the-bar effect is dominant, it should 
have a negative effect. 
Finally, I include the average levels of inflation using the GDP 
deflator (Inflation) for each corresponding sample period to reflect 
the economic conditions of a country at the time when a patent 
application is filed. Generally, an inventor will be less likely to utilize 
her invention during times of economic turmoil. Hence, I expect the 
estimated coefficient to carry a negative sign to the extent that 
inflation signals economic turmoil.11
11 Data for the variables are obtained from World Development Indicators, 
CD-ROM, 2000 unless noted otherwise.
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TABLE 2









Higher Education 0.0163(3.4646) 0.0174(3.7985) 0.0174(3.9505)
Openness -0.0035(-1.3156) -0.0023(-0.7881) -0.0034(-1.6634)
Inflation 0.0002(7.5061) 0.0001(6.9708) 0.0002(10.955)
Investment -0.0319(-1.9066) -0.0323(-2.1686) -0.0464(-3.6938)




DW 2.2329 2.2231 2.2337
F-Statistic 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: Numbers in the parenthesis are t-statistics.
D. Estimation
With the data in hand, Equation (14) is estimated by FGLS. Table 2 
shows the results of estimation. All the measures of financial 
development come out positive and significant suggesting that 
financial development has a positive effect on the rate of 
technological change. 
Higher education is generally positive and significant as expected. 
Openness comes out with a negative sign and is insignificant, which 
may suggest that the raising-the-bar effect is dominant. This is in 
line with Porter and Stern (2000)'s finding that a cross-country 
spillover is weakly negative. Investment is negative and insignificant. 
This suggests that, although a higher investment may produce more 
technological innovations, it does not necessarily yield a faster rate 
of technological change. A possible interpretation, then, would be 
that there is decreasing returns to investment in terms of the rate of 
knowledge production. Knowledge stock is positive but insignificant. 
Inflation comes out significant and weakly positive, which is in line 
with the R&D literature. However its effect seems to be fairly small. 
Overall, the results obtained so far yields a strong support for the 
finance-led growth hypothesis.
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Iran, Islamic Rep. Israel Jamaica Korea, Rep.
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Source: WDI 2000 CD-ROM
FIGURE 3
NET INFLOWS OF FDI AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP 
IN THE SAMPLE COUNTRIES
E. Robustness
a) Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
Recently, much debate has ensued about the effects of FDIs on 
host county's economic activities. As innovators pursue their 
activities in response to changes in the economic structure of his or 
her own country, flows of FDI may also play an important role in 
how innovators behave in terms of knowledge production. Addi-
tionally, besides changing the incentive structure faced by the 
innovators, FDIs can be a direct source of knowledge from 
technologically more advanced countries upon which domestic 
innovators can draw.
Figure 3 shows the trend of FDI inflows in the countries 
considered in this study. Overall, FDIs take up only a small fraction 
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TABLE 3









Higher Education 0.0127(2.7805) 0.0122(3.1101) 0.0126(4.0682)
Openness -0.0025(-1.0610) -0.0014(-0.4802) -0.0028(-0.7882)
Inflation 0.0002(8.2517) 0.0002(8.2935) 0.0002(13.6122)
Investment -0.0465(-3.0204) -0.0479(-3.3214) -0.0533(-4.8977)
Knowledge Stock 0.0041(0.0591) -0.0025(-0.0395) 0.0080(0.1617)




DW 2.2646 2.264144 2.2700
F-Statistic 0.0000 0.000000 0.0000
Note: Numbers in the parenthesis are t-statistics.
of each country's GDP with minor exceptions. Also, although the flow 
of FDIs each country receives is increasing over time, there are no 
drastic changes in the amount of FDI inflows except for Singapore, 
Trinidad & Tobago, and Chile. However, it is still possible that the 
sample countries may depend largely on foreign sources as a 
provider of knowledge stock upon which they build their own 
technological innovations. Thus, I re-estimate the Equation (14) with 
FDI.
Table 3 shows the results. The overall results are similar to the 
original regression. It should be noted, though, that including FDI in 
the estimation reduces the size and the significance of financial 
development measures while slightly improving the fit of the model. 
Still, financial development indicators enter significantly in the 
equation. At the same time, FDI itself seems to be an important 
determinant of the rate of technological innovation, albeit its effect is 
rather weak. 
b) Law and Trade
There is increasing evidence in the literature that legal structure 
such as intellectual property protection plays a non-negligible role in 
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knowledge production processes (La Porta et al. 1996). This may be 
especially true for patent production. I use the initial values of a 
legal index compiled by Gwartney et al. (2002) to reflect the degree of 
IP protection within each country (Law). This is a composite index of 
judicial prudence, impartial courts, protection of intellectual 
property, military interference in rule of law and the political process 
and integrity of the legal system. It provides a more comprehensive 
coverage of the legal system than typical indexes used in the 
literature, which represents only a particular aspect of the legal 
framework of a given country. The literature predicts that it should 
have positive effects on knowledge production.
An examination of the sample countries reveals that many of them 
are Latin American countries. Hence, one can make a claim that 
these countries apply for a patent in the U.S. because of 
geographical proximity. In other words, some countries may choose 
to apply for a patent in the U.S. because the costs of doing so may 
be relatively smaller than other countries. However, a more valid 
argument would be that a country's willingness to apply for a patent 
in the U.S. may be significantly influenced by its trade patterns. If 
an innovator resides in a country that has a heavy trade relationship 
with the U.S., he or she may be more inclined to apply for a patent 
in the U.S. as the need for protection for his or her invention might 
be relatively stronger. For example, Korea is much further away from 
the U.S. than, say, Argentina, but the volume of patents applied for 
by Korea by the end of 1999 is fifty times that by Argentina. To 
measure this trade pattern, I use data from UNCTAD (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development). In the UNCTAD database, no 
data about the trade volume of a country with the U.S. is available. 
Hence, I use the initial values of a country's trade volume, both 
exports and imports, as a share of GDP with the North American 
region (the U.S. and Canada) instead (Trade).12 
Additionally, note that Knowledge Stock and Openness are dropped 
from the regression as they were consistently insignificant in the 
previous analysis.13
12 South Africa is dropped from the sample when Trade variable is included 
in the regression.
13 Adding them doesn't change the results at all, but the fit is deteriorated. 
The results with these variables included are available upon request. 
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TABLE 4









Higher Education 0.0242(6.6980) 0.0246(7.3736) 0.0230(7.3859)
Inflation 0.0002(16.2775) 0.0002(13.0640) 0.0003(17.0192)
Investment -0.0916(-5.6451) -0.0992(-6.4904) -0.0925(-6.7840)
FDI 0.0104(0.7729) 0.0088(0.7296) 0.0063(0.5559)
Law -0.0737(-4.7228) -0.0789(-5.1641) -0.0611(-4.3144)




DW 2.4366 2.4346 2.4141
F-Statistic 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: Numbers in the parenthesis are t-statistics.
Table 4 shows the results of estimation when Law and Trade are 
included in the regression. Including these variables change the 
results somewhat. The effects of Trade seem enormous compared to 
other variables in the regression providing a valid ground to the 
claim that a country's propensity to patent in the U.S. has a lot to 
do with its trade patterns. However, although the effects of financial 
development indicators is noticeably reduced, financial development 
still seems to be an important determinant of patent growth, except 
for Liquidity. At the same time, FDI also loses its significance. 
What is interesting is that Law comes significantly but with a 
negative sign. One plausible interpretation would be that a weak 
legal system of a home country induces firms/inventors to seek 
patent protection from abroad (the U.S.). In other words, if a home 
country provides adequate legal protection for innovations, firms/
inventors will be less motivated to apply for patent protection 
elsewhere. If this were true, then the frequency with which a foreign 
firm/individual applies for a patent protection in the U.S. may be 
negatively correlated with strength of the legal system in the home 
country. Hence, the negative sign I get here may simply be an 
artifact of using USPTO data instead of home country patent data. 
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The current analysis suggests that the rate of technological 
innovation is influenced mainly by educational quality of the 
population and the degree of financial development as the model 
presented here suggests. More to the point, it provides an answer as 
to how the financial sector promotes economic growth. In other 
words, one way that financial development enhances economic 
growth is through, at least partially, promoting innovative activities.
c) Outliers
Lastly, an examination of the data reveals that there are some 
countries whose patenting rates are quite different than the rest of 
the sample countries. They are Israel, Iceland, Korea, and Singapore. 
These countries' patent rates are higher than the rest by a factor of 
more than ten. The drastic difference in the patent rates between 
these countries and the rest may be due to a significantly different 
innovative structure. In addition, these countries have been highly 
successful in modernizing and developing their economies. Hence 
lumping them together with the other countries in the sample may 
yield inaccurate description of how financial development affects the 
innovative processes. Also, it is possible to imagine that these highly 
successful countries may be driving the results that were found 
previously. To consider these possibilities, I ran the regression 
without these four countries. 
Table 5 shows the results. As can be seen, dropping Israel, 
Iceland, Korea, and Singapore does not change the results in any 
meaningful ways. Financial development indicators are still significant 
although its powers are somewhat less.
V. Conclusion
This paper investigates the relationship between the financial 
sector and economic growth by focusing on a specific channel of 
influence, innovation. The basic idea of this paper starts from the 
proposition that innovation and investment therein are an important 
determinant of economic growth. Then, the degree of development of 
the financial sector that distributes funds among various economic 
activities should matter for economic growth. This is the essence of 
the finance-led growth hypothesis.
FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT ON INNOVATION 157
TABLE 5









Higher Education 0.0469(5.2754) 0.0445(5.0538) 0.0499(5.7289)
Inflation 0.0002(6.0451) 0.0002(4.6684) 0.0002(9.5164)
Investment -0.0652(-2.3942) -0.0611(-2.3042) -0.0784(-4.5101)
FDI -0.0404(-1.0379) -0.0333(-0.8848) -0.0423(-1.1747)
Law -0.0990(-6.3027) -0.1006(-6.5552) -0.0900(-5.8472)




DW 2.4806 2.4804 2.5048
F-Statistic 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: Numbers in the parenthesis are t-statistics.
In order to examine this issue, I test empirically the relationship 
between financial development and the rate of technological 
innovation. With a simple model of endogenous growth extended to 
consider the effects of agency costs serving as a theoretical motivation, 
empirical analysis using patent growth rates as a proxy for the rate 
of technological innovation is conducted on a panel of 27 developing 
countries from 1970 to 2000. The approach employed in this paper 
has two advantages over the current studies. Firstly, the channel of 
influence from the financial sector to the real sector is explicitly 
specified, which has been missing in the current literature. Secondly, 
my approach resolves the issue of endogeneity, at least better than 
the existing literature, so that interpretation of the results is clearer.
This paper sheds further light as to how development in the 
financial sector affects growth. My analysis indicates that financial 
development affects economic growth by promoting technological 
change, a fundamental driving engine of economic growth, rendering 
further support for the finance-led growth hypothesis. 
(Received 8 November 2006; Revised 28 December 2006)
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Comments by Kyoobok Lee *14
It has been a pleasure to read and discuss Dr. Kim's paper. This 
paper studied how financial development can affect technological 
progress and he nicely showed that financial development is one of 
the most important sources for technological progress. Since he 
talked about both theoretical and empirical work, I shall say a few 
words on each. 
Let me briefly share my opinion about his theoretical work. First, 
in his model, the certain portion of the final goods ((1－s)Y) is used 
for consumption and the remaining portion of the final goods (sY) is 
used for the production of intermediates and R&D. In addition to 
that, he implicitly assumes that the price of final goods is one. 
Therefore, I think that his r in the intermediate good sector's profit 
maximization (what he calls the cost of borrowing capital) has to be 
equal to one, which is the price of final goods. The price of 
intermediate goods should be (1/α ) which is so called monopoly 
pricing. Actually, the intermediate good producers do not need to 
borrow input because he can make a profit in each period. In this 
model, within one period, intermediate good producers can buy some 
input from final good producers with price one, make some 
intermediate goods and sell them to final good producers with price 
(1/α ). So the intermediate good producers get a profit ((1－α )xi/α ). It 
is completed in one period so the intermediate producers do not 
need to borrow anything in this model. 
Second, in the research sector problem, he assumes that each 
researcher takes as given the actions of other researchers and the 
knowledge stock so that he faces the arrival rate of new technology 
that is depending on the number of intermediate goods and the total 
cost of R&D. I would like to say that this is not a standard 
assumption of a Romer type model. If he would like to use this 
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arrival rate, he has to justify why the arrival rate increases as the 
number of intermediate goods increases and why each researcher 
can enjoy other researchers’ capital. Basically, the arrival rate 
assumption implies that there is uncertainty and R&D competition 
between researchers because the first inventor can get a patent and 
enjoy a monopoly rent forever. So, there is no reason to share capital 
or knowledge. 
Third, I think that his theory is too simple to explain agency costs 
because there are no special characteristics of agency costs in his 
model. He just makes a model such that the agency costs increase 
the researcher's cost of borrowing capital. After that, he just writes 
down the marginal cost of researcher is interest rate plus agency 
costs and asks reader to believe it. However, c can be not only 
agency cost, but also any other cost. Growth economist usually 
considers that c is a kind of risk premium not agency costs. 
Actually, there is a Romer type model in which the inventor of each 
intermediate goods cannot enjoy perpetual monopoly power, but this 
position would erode over time as competitors learned about the new 
product and imitated it or created close substitutes.15 In this model, 
there is r＋c and c is a death probability (the probability the inventor 
will lose his monopoly power). This model can show that, if c＝0, the 
model is exactly same as traditional Romer model and if c＝∞, the 
growth rate would be zero because there is no monopoly rent. So, I 
think that, if he changes his R&D sector into a more traditional 
Romer type model, his model will remain exactly the same, except 
that c is agency cost, not a death probability. If someone wants to 
see more about this model, please, read a growth textbook which is 
written by Barro and Sala-i-martin. 
Now, let me move on to his empirical work, first, I think that the 
number of patents in his selected countries maybe too small. The 
number of patents in at least one third of your selected countries 
may be around 50 for thirty years. Especially, the number of patents 
in Dominican Republic, Jamaica, or Pakistan would be very small ― 
around 20 or 25 for thirty years. Therefore, I am not sure that your 
law of large number argument is valid in this case and I could not 
believe that your result is robust from a time series perspective. If he 
does not start from 1970 or if he does not use 5 year time intervals, 
15 We know that, in a Romer model, the inventor of each intermediate 
goods can enjoy the monopoly power forever.
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the results may be changed.  
Second, he mentions several papers which talk about how the 
patent can reflect an important portion of innovative activities. 
However, I think those papers usually consider U.S or European 
countries or several fast growing Asian countries. I do not think that 
those papers consider his selected countries. In Figure 1, the growth 
rate of patents in 9 countries is negative and the growth rate of 
patents in 17-18 countries is below 1%. If we see the data after we 
exclude the countries whose patent growth rate is more than 1%, I 
guess that the result will change substantially. 
Third, I think that he does not need to blame previous finance and 
growth literature because of endogeneity. He had better say that, 
unlike previous finance and growth literature in which they have 
studied how finance or financial development can affect general 
economic growth, he studies how financial development can affect 
technological progress which is considered as a main engine of 
growth among several growth factors. On the other hand, if he wants 
to say that there is an endogeneity problem in previous literature 
and his model can be one way to correct this problem, in addition to 
explaining why patent data can correct this problem verbally, it 
might be better to report the results of a granger-causality test. So, 
at least, he can show that his proxy for economic growth is better 
than previous ones like the growth rate of GDP. I suspect that 
technological progress in IT industries or computer industries can be 
a leading sector in the process of financial development. Therefore, 
there may be also bi-directionality or reverse causation between 
patent growth and financial development.
Again, I really enjoyed reading Dr. Kim's paper. The most 
fascinating contribution of this paper, in my view, is that he tried to 
test a relationship between finance and growth with patent data 
instead of the GDP growth rate. Therefore, he can be more focused 
on the effects of financial development on technological progress. So 
far, we know that empirical microeconomic studies have used patent 
data to examine innovation of firms or industries, but this paper 
tried to use patent data to study macroeconomic growth. 

